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ARTICLES
"IMMINENT DANGER" WITHIN 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) OF
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT:
ARE CONGRESS AND COURTS BEING REALISTIC?
B. Patrick Costello, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Faced with "the alarming explosion in the number of frivolous law-
suits filed by State and Federal prisoners,"1 Congress passed the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act ("PLRA") of 1995.2 The PLRA incorporates 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g), which is "popularly known as the 'three strikes' rule.",3 Except in
very limited circumstances, § 1915(g) forecloses access to the federal courts
for the targeted class of indigent prisoner litigants. Therefore, "aside from
the most extraordinary circumstances, § 1915(g) radically reduces the role of
federal courts in protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners by prohibit-
ing in forma pauperis ("IFP") status for those prisoners who have had three
prior dismissals for frivolousness or for failure to state a claim."4 Such a
prisoner is, of course, free to pursue a claim and pay for the filing fees and
other expenses. Yet because most inmates generally lack sufficient wealth
and find it difficult to pay the total filing fee within thirty days as normally
required, approximately ninety-five percent of prisoner-initiated suits are
filed IFP.'
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2002; M.B.A., Old Dominion University, 1999; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1990. I wish to acknowledge the able and invaluable assistance of Ms. Lucy S. Payne, Research
Librarian at the Notre Dame Law School, for her astute and patient guidance in the course of the legislative
history research necessary to successfully and thoroughly create this work.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act is a dynamic statute of great import, and consequently new cases
involving it are decided nationwide practically every day. Therefore, for purposes of efficiency and the de-
mands inherent in the publication process, this work generally addresses federal cases that have been decided
on or before April 30, 2002.
1. 141 CONG. REc. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
2. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66, (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections).
3. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 310 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
4. Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You're Out of Court-It May
be Effective, But is it Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 471,497 (1997).
5. Sharone Levy, Note, Balancing Physical Abuse by the System Against Abuse of the System: Defining
"Imminent Danger" Within the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 86 IOWA L. REv. 361, 362 (2000)
(advocating a standard that allows a prisoner who would otherwise be precluded to file informa pauperis if he
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Section 1915(g) states:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incar-
cerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or ap-
peal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is un-
der imminent danger of serious physical injury.6
Section 1915(g), the "three strikes" rule, does not provide a defini-
tion of "imminent danger." Indeed, exhaustive research has revealed a com-
plete lack of legislative history to help judges, practitioners, and prisoners
alike determine the meaning and extent of "imminent danger." Conse-
quently, much confusion has been created in the federal court system as to
exactly how and when the phrase "imminent danger of serious physical in-
jury" should be interpreted.
This work will shed light on the issue through an examination of re-
cent federal cases and pertinent commentary on the subject. After Part II
presents a brief overview of the PLRA and explores the lack of meaningful
legislative history on this Act, Part III will explore whether the "three
strikes" rule is both effective and equitable in light of its "imminent danger
of serious physical injury" requirement. In particular, Part III shall focus on
exactly what is "imminent danger" in a prison context and when it should be
assessed within the statutory exception to the "three strikes rule." A thor-
ough overview presents the viewpoints of federal judges and law review
commentators regarding "imminent danger" in light of the absence of any
clear and meaningful Congressional intent. While there are no hard and fast
answers to this question, all salient points of view are presented. Particular
emphasis is paid to a recent Third Circuit case that methodically reveals the
crucial details inherent in this debate. This work concludes with a recom-
has been under imminent danger at any time related to the cause of action). The rationale and procedure
involved with IFP status is as follows:
Prisoners traditionally have been allowed to proceed informa pauperis to guarantee that
"no citizen [is] denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil
or criminal, 'in any court of the United States' solely because his. . . poverty makes it
impossible for him... to pay or secure the costs." Currently, a plaintiff must pay be-
tween $105 and $120 in filing fees, but under the in forma pauperis statute, indigent
plaintiffs are allowed to make installment payments after paying an initial partial filing
fee. In the case of a prisoner, this fee is assessed by taking twenty percent of either the
deposits to or the average balance of his prisoner trust fund account, whichever amount
is greater.
Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
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mendation for an appropriate and warranted approach, suggesting that Con-
gress amend § 1915(g) to elucidate what it means by "imminent danger" so
that courts may realistically deal with frivolous and vexatious prisoner law-
suits without ignoring the exigencies inmates may face in the course of
prison life.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PLRA
A. Background
Prisoners in America often allege improprieties or irregularities in
their individual trials and the entire process that led to their convictions.
Further, some inmates have grievances with the prison system, the officials
who run it, and fellow prisoners. Threats of physical harm do exist in many,
if not all, of our prisons. Many of these grievances and complaints warrant
serious consideration by reviewing courts, yet many do not. The sheer num-
ber of possible claims, regardless of the facts and circumstances of each
case, led the Supreme Court to recognize that certain administrative proce-
dures must be pursued before a prisoner may legally take matters into his or
her own hands and attempt an escape or harm a guard or other prisoner.7
The Court specifically noted that a "prisoner must resort to administrative or
judicial channels to remedy coercive prison conditions."' Yet starting in the
1960s and extending over the next four decades, prisoners who found that
internal prison administrative recourse was unsuccessful were able to turn to
the courts for redress. Federal courts acknowledged "that prisoners have
many fundamental rights that can be vindicated in federal court in civil
rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "9 However, as prisons
are places that collect people who suddenly have much free time on their
hands and many possible claims at their disposal, the number of claims filed
by prisoners consequently increased dramatically and led to overly litigious
and abusive litigants.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000) (emphasis added).
7. In the seminal case of United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), the Court held that:
one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating
the law, "a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened
harm," the defenses will fail. Clearly, in the context of prison escape, the escapee is not
entitled to claim a defense of duress or necessity unless and until he demonstrates that,
given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the federal statute dealing with escape
from prison] was his only reasonable alternative.
Id. at 410-11 (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 410 n.8 (citing People v. Richards, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969)).
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B. The Act Itself
"Responding to concerns about overcrowded federal court dockets
and a deluge of frivolous prisoner litigation... Congress took an unprece-
dented step to restrict state and federal prisoners' access to the federal courts
to seek redress for alleged civil rights violations."'" The 104th Congress
(1995-96) commenced work on the PLRA in February 1995 and passed it as
a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill signed into law by President Clin-
ton on April 26, 1996." According to its relatively sparse legislative his-
tory, 1 2 the PLRA "had two ostensible purposes: to end perceived judicial
micromanagement of correctional facilities and to curb the purported flood
of frivolous prisoners' lawsuits inundating the courts."' 3 Consequently, the
PLRA has two components. The first, originally labeled the Stop Turning
Out Prisoners Act, appears to define the circumstances under which courts
may enter injunctions against unconstitutional prison conditions such as
overcrowding and inadequate medical care. 4 The second component ad-
dresses individual suits by prisoners, and the problem of frivolous prisoner
litigation. "
C. Lack of Legislative Guidance
The statutory text of the PLRA contains neither a definition of "im-
minent danger" nor an indication as to how and when such danger should be
9. Lukens, supra note 4, at 474.
10. Id. at 471.
11. Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It
Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 483,
487 (2001). A brief chronology of the PLRA is as follows:
Senator Dole initially introduced the Prison Litigation Reform Act on September 27,
1995, in Senate Bill 1279 cosponsored by Senator Hatch, the chairperson of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, and Senators Abraham, Kyl, Reid, Specter, Hutchinson, Thur-
mond, Santorum, Bond, D'Amato, and Gramm.... President [Clinton], however, ve-
toed the conference version of the bill.... The PLRA provisions were later inserted into
the omnibus appropriations bill enacted into law in April of 1996.
Id. at 487 n.11 (2001) (citations omitted).
12. Indeed, one commentator found the overall history of the PLRA to be quite scant:
A House Report briefly discusses two House bills that were the precursors to the
PLRA-the "Stopping Abusive Prisoner Lawsuits Act" and the "Stop Turning Out
Prisoners Act."... These two bills were incorporated into a broader crime-control bill,
House Resolution 667 .... Beyond the House Report, the PLRA's legislative history
consists primarily of isolated comments of legislators found in the Congressional Re-
cord and the testimony of witnesses during hearings in the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives that focused, only in part, on the precursory legislation.
Id. at 487-88 n. 12 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at489.
14. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) (2000), 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(2) (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2000) and other scattered sections).
15. See Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 802, 110 Stat. at 1321-65 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
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assessed. 6 In such a situation, many believe that the next logical step in the
interpretation of a statutory provision is to turn to the pertinent legislative
history. 7 Yet, extensive research reveals a dearth of any relevant legislative
history on the meaning of "imminent danger" within the context of §
1915(g). In fact, a thorough search of the entire Congressional Record for
the 104th Congress and the full text of all Congressional Reports for the
104th Congress revealed that Congress failed in any way to consider the
meaning of "imminent danger."'"
Numerous law review commentators have also examined this issue
and have written that there is scant legislative history that is helpful in inter-
preting this statute. In this light, one author has cynically criticized the
process by which the PLRA was enacted:
[T]he PLRA was attached as a rider to an omnibus appropriations
bill. This bill was the byproduct of Congress's failure in 1995 to
enact eight of the thirteen annual appropriations bills funding fed-
eral agencies. This failure was largely attributable to the inclusion
of riders in those bills concerning such controversial issues as
abortion, environmental regulation, and prisoner litigation.
Congress's failure to enact these appropriations bills led to a budget-
ary crisis and two government shutdowns, for a week in November of 1995
and twenty-one days during December and January. Congress then used
stopgap measures---"mini" continuing resolutions-to fund the government
until the omnibus appropriations bill was finally enacted in April of 1996.
Buried in the fine print of that bill was the PLRA.' 9
Yet it was not just members of the academy who decried the manner
in which this Act was pushed through Congress. Prominent members of
Congress decried Congress's cryptic review of the provisions of the PLRA.20
16. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).
17. However, many esteemed lawyers and scholars disagree with this approach. For example, the "most
prominent standard bearer" of the textual approach to interpretation, Justice Scalia, argues "that legislative
history is an unreliable and illegitimate guide to statutory meaning." He further believes "that non-textual
approaches give judges excessive interpretive latitude, while inviting Congress improperly to leave difficult
questions to the courts." RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 759 (4th ed. 1996) (citation omitted).
18. The principle tool used to conduct this research was LEXIS-NEXIS Congressional Universe, at
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp. Using this database, a keyword search using "imminent danger" was
conducted of the entire Congressional Record for the 104th Congress. Furthermore, a similar keyword search
was also conducted of every committee report for the 104th Congress. Both searches revealed a complete lack
of legislative history or guidance as to what Congress intended "imminent danger" to mean.
19. Branham, supra note 11, at 537-38 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 538. Examples include Senator Kennedy's statement that
[a]lthough a version of the PLRA was introduced as a free-standing bill and referred to
the Judiciary Committee, it was never the subject of a committee mark-up, and there is
no Judiciary Committee report explaining the proposal. The PLRA was the subject of a
single hearing in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type of thorough review that a
2002]
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Overall, the lack of statutory guidance and the abbreviated manner in which
Congress passed the PLRA led to a lack of any meaningful legislative debate
or resultant legislative history on the entire Act, not to mention the meaning
of "imminent danger." Consequently, as will be seen below, federal judges
have been forced to use alternative methods in their handling of PLRA cases.
III. "IMMINENT DANGER" IN A PRISON CONTEXT AND WHEN IT
SHOULD BE ASSESSED WITHIN THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO
THE "THREE STRIKES RULE"
The PLRA's "three strikes rule" provides for an exception if the IFP
"prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury."'" It is worth
noting at the outset that the exception appears to apply only to imminent
physical, not imminent psychological danger.22 Indeed, the limited anecdotal
evidence presented at the only hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee 23 and during the debates on the Senate floor regarding enactment of the
PLRA certainly suggest that a clear distinction between mental and emo-
tional distress and physical injuries might eliminate a number of frivolous
suits. 24 For example, if given the ability to file suits for mental and emo-
tional injuries alone, inmates complain to the courts about bad haircuts by
prison barbers, being served chunky rather than creamy peanut butter,25 or
measure of this scope deserves.
Id. at 538 n.249 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Senator Simon proclaimed: "I am very discouraged that
this legislation was considered as one of many issues on an appropriations bill. Legislation with such far
reaching implications certainly deserves to be thoroughly examined by the committee of jurisdiction and not
passed as a rider to an appropriations bill." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, Representative Mollohan cynically
stated:
The issues raised by these three legislative proposals are in the jurisdiction of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. These items include a major legislative rewrite of the Truth in
Sentencing initiative grants, prison litigation reform and Legal Services Corporation.
All these provisions amend current law and have impacts that are not clearly defined,
despite the claims of the Committee on the Judiciary. The reasons they have ended up
in this appropriations bill are unclear to me, because as far as I know, we still have a
Committee on the Judiciary with an especially competent chairman and ranking mem-
ber, and I see no reason why an appropriations bill should contain such extensive au-
thorizing language.
Id. (citations omitted).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).
22. This author does not mean to discount the fact that there are often instances and situations where truly
severe psychological stressors such as fear and anxiety regarding possible future harm may be manifested in
physical harm. However, thorough examination of such a subject is perhaps more suitable for a doctoral thesis
in psychology, and any effective treatment of this would involve traveling far afield from the world of mean-
ingful legal research and into the social sciences.
23. See statement of Senator Kennedy, supra note 20.
24. Stacey Heather O'Bryan, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act's Physical Injury Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1194
(1997).
25. Id.
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being issued Converse sneakers rather than Reeboks.26 One prisoner even
sued due to failure of prison officials to invite that inmate to a pizza party
for a departing prison employee.
2 7
Frivolous cases such as these have, in part, led courts to usually in-
terpret and apply the three strikes provision broadly. 2  Courts generally con-
strue "imminent danger of serious physical injury" strictly.29  In fact, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has gone so far as to
hold that "the statute's use of the present tense verb[ ] . . . 'is' demonstrates
an otherwise ineligible prisoner is only eligible [for waiver of the three
strikes rule] to proceed IFP if he is in imminent danger at the time of fil-
ing. '3
°
A. How "Imminent Danger" Is Currently Construed:
The Abdul-Akbar Majority Opinion
There are several cases that have addressed when imminence of dan-
ger should be assessed, and those courts are far from uniform in their ap-
proach.3  However, one case in particular-bdul-Akbar v. McKelvie 2-
stands out as clearly presenting all sides of this issue and therefore warrants
extensive discussion.
In Abdul-Akbar, the Third Circuit considered en banc the question of
whether "imminent danger" is to be "assessed as of the time the complaint is
filed, or at some time in the past, even though that danger no longer exists
when the complaint is filed."33  Abandoning its prior holding in Gibbs v.
26. Id.
27. 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
28. Peter Hobart, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance Between Law and Order, 44
VILL. L. REv. 981, 985 (1999) (citing In re Crittendem, 143 F.3d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1998) ("holding that three
strikes applies to writs of mandamus"); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1996) ("holding
that PLRA's three strikes provision applies to appeal pending prior to effective date of PLRA")).
29. Id. (citing Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 724 (1lth Cir. 1998) ("denying waiver to prisoner who
alleged doctor had touched him improperly during exam"); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir.
1996) ("holding that 'reasonable fear' of assault, as opposed to assault itself, is insufficient to constitute com-
pensable claim") (quoting Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1996). But cf Ashley v. Dilworth,
147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cit. 1998) ("holding that placement of inmate near enemies constituted sufficient
danger to overcome three strikes rule")). Ashley is discussed in detail infra at notes 69-74.
30. Id. at 986 (citing Ashley, 147 F.3d at 717).
31. Levy, supra note 5, at 365. The following cases illustrate this point: Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d
1189 (11 th Cir. 1999) (held "as a matter of first impression that the prisoner's allegation of past danger is
insufficient to fall under the exception"); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1998) ("holding proper
consideration of imminent danger is at the time of filing"); Banos v. O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883 (5th Cit. 1998)
("requiring imminent danger at the time the prisoner seeks to file suit"); Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.
1997) (until overruled by Abdul-Akbar, discussed infra, the Third Circuit via Gibbs stood apart as "the lone
jurisdiction to assess the existence of imminent danger at the time of the alleged incident and not at the time of
filing"). Id. at 365 n.18.
32. 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
33. Id. at 312.
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Roman3 4 that "imminent danger" is assessed at the time of the alleged inci-
dent, the court instead adopted "the construction set forth by the Fifth,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit, that a prisoner may invoke the 'imminent dan-
ger' exception only to seek relief from a danger which is 'imminent' at the
time the complaint is filed."35 The Abdul-Akbar court concluded that this
interpretation was consistent with the plain language of § 1915(g), with con-
gressional intent, and with the legislative purpose of the PLRA as a whole.36
1. Statutory Interpretation
After acknowledging that this was a case of statutory construction
regarding the meaning of § 1915(g),37 the court applied "settled precepts of
statutory construction and [took as a] beginning point a recognition that from
the earliest times [the court] adopted what is called the American Plain
Meaning Rule. .. .,38 The Supreme Court restated the rule in 1993, holding,
"[o]ur task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has
been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."3 9 Further,
If the language of the statute is plain, the sole function of the court
is to enforce the statute according to its terms. The plain meaning
is conclusive, therefore, "except in the 'rare cases [in which] the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters."'
40
2. Applying the American Plain Meaning Rule to § 1915(g)
The court next applied the American Plain Meaning Rule to the lan-
guage of § 1915(g). The court interpreted the first clause of § 1915(g), "in
no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil
34. 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
35. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312. See also Majorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
"Three Strikes" Rule Under 28 US.C. § 1915(g) Barring Prisoners From In Pauperis Filing of Civil Suit
After Three Dismissals For Frivolity, 168 A.L.R. FED. 433, § 7 (2001) (providing survey of federal courts of
appeals holdings regarding what constitutes "imminent" danger for purposes of exception to rule).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 313. The American Plain Meaning Rule states:
It is elementary that the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in
the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Where the language is plain and admits of
no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which
are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.
Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917)).
39. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313 (quoting Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993)).
[Vol. 29:1
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action or proceeding under this section,"'" to "obviously mean[] 'a prisoner
may not file a new civil complaint.' 4 2  The word 'bring' in that clause
"plainly refers to the time when the civil action is initiated."'43 Acknowledg-
ing that the clause "'unless [the prisoner] is in imminent danger of serious
physical injury' is an exception to the preclusive effect of the statute,"44 the
court noted that this "exception is cast in the present tense, not in the past
tense, and the word 'is' in the exception refers back to the same point in time
as the first clause, i.e., the time of filing.
45
In other words, Congress meant that the "'imminent danger' [must]
exist contemporaneously with the bringing of the action., 46 The court added,
"[s]omeone whose danger has passed cannot reasonably be described as
someone who 'is' in danger, nor can that past danger reasonably be de-
scribed as 'imminent."' 47  This view was supported with reference to similar
holdings from the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit.48  Overall, the major-
ity of the en banc Third Circuit held that "the statute plainly means that a
prisoner is not permitted to file his complaint unless he is, at that time, under
imminent danger. Viewed from the Plain Meaning Rule, we interpret 'is
under imminent danger' to relate to the time when 'a prisoner bring[s] a civil
action."
49
40. Id. (internal citations omitted).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
42. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313.
43. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1998)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Abdul-Akbar. 239 F.3d at 313-14 (("[T]he language of § 1915(g), by using the present tense,
clearly refers to the time when the action or appeal is filed or the motion for I.F.P. status is made.") (quoting
Banos v. O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998)); (("As the statute's use of the present tense verbs 'bring'
and 'is' demonstrates, an otherwise ineligible prisoner is only eligible to proceed I.F.P. if he is in imminent
danger at the time offiling. Allegations that the prisoner has faced imminent danger in the past are insufficient
to trigger this exception to § 1915(g) and authorize the prisoner to pay the filing fee on the installment plan.")
(quoting Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998)) (Yet Ashley also lends support to the Abdul-
Akbar dissenters' argument, as is discussed in further detail infra at notes 69-74 and accompanying text.);
(("Congress's use of the present tense in § 1915(g) confirms that a prisoner's allegation that he faced imminent
danger sometime in the past is an insufficient basis to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis .. ") (empha-
sis added) (quoting Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11 th Cir. 1999)).
49. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313. The author of this work does not disagree with the Abdul-Akbar major-
ity's method of statutory construction. However, as presented below, respectful disagreement does arise with
the court's end result of that interpretation regarding when "imminent" should be measured. This author also
disagrees with Congress's seemingly careless enactment of a provision that effectively bars many post-"three
strikes" indigent inmates from the protection of courts should a valid threat of imminent danger of serious
physical injury emerge. These contentions are further developed infra, commencing at footnote 55 and ac-
companying text.
2002]
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3. Where the Majority Is On Point: The Purpose of the PLRA
In disputing appellant Abdul-Akbar's contention that "requiring
proof of imminent danger as of the time of filing is inconsistent with Con-
gress's intent," 50 the court found "congressional intent clear [after an exami-
nation of] the purpose of the entire PLRA. ' '51 In order to curtail "the filing
of frivolous and vexatious prisoner lawsuits ... Congress curtailed the abil-
ity of prisoners to take advantage of the privilege of filing I.F.P."52 Indeed,
Congress intended the "three strikes" rule to supply "a powerful economic
incentive not to file frivolous lawsuits or appeals,"53 and Congress
has deliberately decided to legislate on this subject by proclaiming,
as public policy, a determination to reduce prisoner litigation in the
federal courts. As citizens, we may disagree with the congres-
sional wisdom, but as judges, knowing the clearly stated legislative
purpose, we may not disembowel the legislative act. Federal
courts, unlike state common law King's Bench courts, do not have
unlimited power and authority. We are limited to that which has
been granted by Congress. What Congress gives it may also take
away. The ability to proceed I.F.P. is not a constitutional right.
Congress granted the right to proceed I.F.P. in 1892, and it has the
power to limit this statutorily created right. Here it has taken away
our ability as judges to grant I.F.P. status to a "three strikes" pris-
oner, no matter how meritorious his or her subsequent claims may
be, unless the prisoner "is under imminent danger of serious physi-
cal injury" when he or she "bring[s] a civil action." Congress has
held trump here, and it has dealt a hand. As judges we must play
it.
4
4. Where the Majority Falls Wide of the Mark: Practical Pitfalls of the
PLRA in Light of Prison Life
Dismissing on procedural grounds Abdul-Akbar's claim that
such an "interpretation of the statute runs counter to the Eighth
Amendment,"55 the majority stated that appellant Abdul-Akbar had
"waived this argument by not raising it in his opening brief."56 Abdul-
Akbar had argued that the "right to be free from serious physical in-
50. Id. at 314.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at315-16.
55. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 316 n.2.
56. Id.
[Vol. 29:1
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jury while in prison is surely as fundamental as the right to divorce," 7
and that he was "entitled to a waiver of the filing fees as a matter of
law." 8 The dissent contended that the court should ignore this waiver
because, inter alia, "the right to be free from serious physical injury is
just as weighty as the right to a divorce at issue in Boddie, and ... that
such a right represents a fundamental interest for Boddie purposes."59
The majority summarily brushed aside this argument in a footnote,
stating
the importance of the underlying right is largely immaterial to the
question whether that right is a fundamental interest for Boddie
purposes .... an underlying constitutional entitlement rises to the
level of a Boddie fundamental interest only when the government
blocks the sole legal means for safeguarding that entitlement, and
not simply because the interest itself is a weighty one.6 °
Yet this is exactly where the Abdul-Akbar majority erred in its analy-
sis, for in the cases of many prisoners the government has indeed blocked the
sole legal means for safeguarding the right to be free from serious physical
injury while in prison. The serious physical injury exception to Congress's
"three strikes" rule, ostensibly "for those cases in which it appears that judi-
cial action is needed as soon as possible to prevent serious physical injuries
from occurring in the meantime,",6' is ineffective when analyzed in light of
the realities of prison life and the exigencies often faced therein. The major-
ity was certainly aware that there are at least some instances in prison life
where an inmate is in danger of serious physical injury. They approached
this issue by defining "imminent" dangers as "those dangers which are about
to occur at any moment or are impending"62 and by definition "always exist[]
in the moments before any such injury is inflicted., 63 Applying these defini-
tions to the former Gibbs approach, the majority suggested that
any time that an otherwise disqualified prisoner alleges that any
threat of physical injury occurred at any time, that prisoner auto-
matically qualifies for the imminent danger exception. The Gibbs
interpretation of the imminent danger exception thereby swallows
the rule. Like every other court of appeals that has considered this
57. Id (quoting brief for the appellant which cited as authority Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 319.
62. Id. at 315 (citing WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 611 (1984)).
63. Id. at 315.
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issue, we refuse to conclude that with one hand Congress intended
to enact a statutory rule that would reduce the huge volume of
prisoner litigation, but, with the other hand, it engrafted an open-
ended exception that would eviscerate the rule.6 4
However, the majority does not adequately address the fact that
Congress's "economic deterrence rationale"65 behind the "three strikes" rule
fails to protect the needs of indigent prisoners due to the following practical
aspects of prison life: "imminent danger" can reasonably be considered a
constant, on-going threat in certain prison-life scenarios, and the filing
requirements for a civil action or appeal are such that often the danger will
have been realized before the matter is brought before a court. As these rea-
sons of practicality are thoroughly laid out in the Abdul-Akbar dissent, it
therefore warrants discussion in this work.
B. How "Imminent Danger" Should Be Construed
The Abdul-Akbar Dissenting Opinion
A portion of the dissent's initial attack on the majority opinion is the
statement that
[n]o clear intent may be discerned from § 1915(g)'s use of the pre-
sent tense ("unless the prisoner is in imminent danger"), because
the same subsection elsewhere employs the present tense in refer-
ence to what are expressly recognized as past events ("if the pris-
oner has brought an action or appeal ... that was dismissed in the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim...
.,,).66
The dissenters believe that "[t]his erroneous combination of tenses
renders the statutory provision ambiguous, and. . such ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of preserving the right of access to the courts for prisoners
threatened with bodily injury. ' 67 However, "the majority appears simply to
assume that its holding that imminent danger must be assessed at the time of
filing is dispositive of this case . . . . In so assuming, the majority seriously
undermines protection of physically endangered prisoners by paying too lit-
tle heed to ongoing threats."6
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 319.
66. Id. at 320 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
67. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 320 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 321 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
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This conception of imminent danger has been explicitly recognized
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Ashley v. Dilworth.69
In that case, prisoner Ashley had listed other inmates on his "enemy alert
list" which was given to prisoner authorities for the ostensible purpose of
keeping Ashley separated from those inmates for his own protection.7"
Prison officials were aware that these other inmates had assaulted Ashley on
prior occasions, yet the guards did not keep him separate from those in-
mates." Careful review of the pleadings and official prison reports led the
court to agree with Ashley that the prison officials had actually threatened
"to transfer him so as to place him near an enemy, intending that he be
harmed., 72 Indeed, Ashley was subsequently twice attacked by his enemy,
once with a sharpened screwdriver and once with a butcher knife. 73  The
Eight Circuit panel held that Ashley "properly alleged an ongoing danger"
and thereby met "the imminent danger exception of § 19 15(g). 74
As previously noted, Congress failed to define in the PLRA the fun-
damental phrase "imminent danger., 75 The Abdul-Akbar majority provides a
lengthy explication of statutory tense and applies a dictionary definition for
the meaning of "imminent., 76 However, this treatment of "imminent" danger
glosses over the crucial import of this phrase. The majority acknowledged
that the purpose of the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" excep-
tion is to "prevent[] future harms. 77 Yet the dissent is very clear in pointing
out that such a definition is far too restrictive. 78 To be sure,
[i]n a real-world prison setting, the timing of an attack cannot be
so neatly predicted. It may be that an ongoing threat of danger
looms over a prisoner for an extended period. At any given mo-
ment, the harm might not be "about to" occur; then again, it might.
Such is the nature of "danger." It involves risk, not certainty.79
In the absence of any clear statutory text or Congressional guidance
regarding the phrase "imminent danger" in the PLRA, "it may be instructive
... to consider the definition accorded the same phrase in other contexts. '80
69. 147 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1998).
70. Id. at 716.
71. Id. at 717.
72. Id.
73. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 717.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
77. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315.
78. Id. at 321 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
80. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
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For example, many courts have considered the meaning of "immi-
nent" in the context of self-defense statutes, which are quite comparable to
the PLRA as far as the type of physical threat a person might face and possi-
bly even the span of time in which they face it. This is especially true in the
context of domestic abuse cases. In a 1992 self-defense case, Judge Cum-
mings wrote for a panel of the Seventh Circuit that
[i]nterpretation of the word imminent, as immediate or otherwise,
is a matter of state law that must be decided by state courts and
legislatures. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987)
("Whether or not we would choose to interpret a similarly worded
federal regulation in that fashion, we are bound by the state court's
interpretation, which is relevant to our constitutional analysis only
insofar as it fixes the meaning of the regulation."). 81
Judge Cummings continued by noting that "regardless of the merits
of a particular construction of the word imminent in self-defense statutes,
ultimately the meaning of that word is an issue upon which state courts can
and do differ.
82
Yet a case from the same circuit, United States v. Haynes,8 3 illus-
trates the approach taken by many courts in self-defense cases that a threat is
not "imminent" if retreat or similar step avoids injury.84 This approach ig-
nores the real-life exigencies inmates face in the course of prison life. In-
mate-defendant Haynes preemptively attacked another inmate who had been
menacingly threatening him over a period of a month. Writing for a panel
that also included Judges Coffey and Evans, Judge Easterbrook laid out the
chilling factual scenario in Haynes:
Haynes made an offer of proof that Flores-Pedroso was a bully
who had a reputation for coercing smaller inmates (such as
Haynes) to provide favors of all kinds-food, commissary items,
and sex. About a month before the incident in the cafeteria, Flo-
res-Pedroso began pressuring Haynes to use Haynes' position as a
food preparer in the kitchen to do favors for him. Haynes refused,
and in response Flores-Pedroso threatened to make Haynes his
"bitch" (homosexual plaything). For the next month staredowns
81. Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by Eaglin v.
Welborn, 57 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1995)).
82. Id.
83. 143 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding inter alia that defendant-inmate was properly barred from
asserting proposed defense based on self-defense in assault prosecution arising from defendant's conduct in
pouring scalding oil on another inmate who allegedly had threatened him with injury on several occasions,
given that defendant had time and opportunity to pursue lawful alternative of seeking protection from guards,
despite perceived "evils" of such course).
84. Id. at 1091.
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and jostling occurred, while Flores-Pedroso kept up a stream of
threats. One time Flores-Pedroso cornered Haynes in a bathroom,
and Haynes thought that rape was imminent, but another inmate
entered and Flores-Pedroso left. A day before Haynes poured the
oil, Flores-Pedroso picked up Haynes and slammed him to the
ground within sight of a guard, who did nothing. On the day of the
oil incident, Flores-Pedroso told Haynes that as soon as food ser-
vice was closed for the afternoon he would "finish what he
started." Haynes contends that he believed that he would be at-
tacked as soon as he left the cafeteria, and that he struck first in
order to protect himself.
85
In discussing regarding whether Haynes' offer of proof satisfied the
normal understanding of self-defense, the court considered whether Haynes
had been in "imminent" danger at the time he attacked the other inmate:
"Haynes was not faced with an imminent use of force by Flores-Pedroso.
There was a threat of action later that afternoon, but Flores-Pedroso had
made unfulfilled threats before, and anyway 'later' and 'imminent' are oppo-
sites."86
While this discussion of "imminence" may be valid in the context of
immediate self-defense, it bears closer scrutiny in light of § 1915(g)'s excep-
tion for imminent danger of serious physical injury. If one applies the
Haynes court's restrictive understanding of "imminence" or "imminent" to §
1915(g), it appears that there would be few, if any, occasions when an in-
mate would have the necessary time to complete the paperwork necessary to
qualify for the "imminent danger exception" and qualify to file in forma
pauperis. The exception for situations when the prisoner is under "imminent
danger of serious physical injury" will be very difficult to meet because by
the time a prisoner prepares and files a complaint, the imminence of the al-
leged danger likely will have dissipated.87 Under such an understanding, the
harm faced by the inmate could very well be realized immediately after the
danger finally becomes "imminent." Indeed, if the reader puts himself in the
shoes of an inmate who believes he faces a physical attack "as soon as he
[leaves] the cafeteria,"88 the concept of this danger being "imminent" be-
comes much more clear. The procedures and time required to file a civil
85. Id. at 1089-90 (emphases added).
86. Id. at 1090.
87. Lukens, supra note 4, at 497. An illustration of this crucial point serves to elucidate the matter:
For example, if the prisoner's complaint is about a beating at the hands of a correctional
officer, the only way that this complaint could satisfy § 1915(g) is if the prisoner were
to allege that this particular correctional officer regularly beats the prisoner, and that the
physical injury will be brought upon the prisoner again in the future.
Id. at 511.
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action and have it come before a federal court certainly take longer than in-
mate Haynes felt he had before the impending attack by Flores-Pedroso. In
sum, such reasoning effectively eviscerates § 1915(g) and leaves an inmate
facing imminent danger without any possible protection of a court.8 9
The Abdul-Akbar dissenters point out that courts have interpreted
"imminent" much more realistically in Eight Amendment prison cases than
that granted by the majority in the factually similar § 1915(g) context. For
example,
under the Eighth Amendment prison authorities must protect pris-
oners not only from current threats, but also from "sufficiently
imminent dangers"; the courts have defined that phrase as encom-
passing those dangers "likely to cause harm in the 'next week,
month, or year."' Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
1995) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Payne v.
Collins, 986 F. Supp. 1036, 1052 (E.D. Tex. 1997). ... 9
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to define "im-
minent" harm in the relatively benign context of preliminary injunctions to
be "where the potential harm was not 'uncertain or speculative,' but might
be expected to occur before the threat could otherwise be averted."'" And in
discussions of mere standing, not "imminent danger of serious physical in-
jury" as in § 1915(g), courts have framed their inquiry into the 'immediate
threat' as one encompassing consideration of the likelihood of an ongoing
danger, as evidenced by past events."92
As noted above, the Abdul-Akbar majority approached this issue by
defining "imminent" dangers as "those dangers which are about to occur at
any moment or are impending., 93 While the dissent does not question this
common dictionary definition of "imminent" in the context of danger, it is
helpful to parse and scrutinize this meaning to determine if a reasonable and
88. Haynes, 143 F.3dat 1090.
89. Such an action leaves the government open to suits based on the Eighth Amendment. As the United
States Supreme Court noted,
[w]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
safety and general well being.... The rationale for this principle is simple enough:
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's lib-
erty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide
for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amend-
ment ....
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (emphasis added).
90. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 321 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 321-22 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 322 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) ("past
wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury")).
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logical alternative is more appropriate. "Impending" means "to hover
threateningly; to be about to happen."94 Indeed, there are certainly many
realistic and all too common scenarios in the context of prison life where
imminent danger of serious physical injury hovers threateningly over a par-
ticular inmate-one need only look for an example to the unsettling factual
scenario presented by Judge Easterbrook in Haynes.95 Further, such a nar-
row reading of the exception provided for in § 1915(g) will have a far-
reaching effect, as persistent, ongoing imminent danger is a condition all too
often encountered in our nation's prisons.96 The Supreme Court has even
noted that in many prisons, "[g]uards and inmates co-exist in direct and in-
timate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resent-
ment and despair are commonplace."97
Consequently, by
suggesting that the mere passage of time between the incidents and
after the last incident means that the danger was no longer immi-
nent at the time of filing, the [Abdul-Akbar] majority disregards the
continuing, unremedied nature of the factors that allegedly caused
the incidents. Indeed, the occurrence of multiple incidents over a
substantial time period supports rather than undermines the con-
clusion that Appellant's danger was ongoing.
98
In sum, reacting to the Abdul-Akbar majority holding that §
1915(g)'s "imminent danger of serious physical injury" is to be measured as
of the filing date of the IFP prisoner's claim, the dissenters furnished an ex-
tensive and compelling argument that such a view ignores the very real and
very dangerous category of "ongoing threats" that continue to exist in our
prisons.
IV. CONCLUSION
Responding to concerns about overcrowded federal court dockets
and a deluge of frivolous prisoner litigation, Congress took an unprecedented
step to restrict state and federal prisoners' access to the federal courts to seek
redress for alleged civil rights violations. Yet Congress failed to consider at
all the meaning of "imminent danger," and this has forced federal judges to
use alternative methods in their handling of PLRA cases.
93. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
94. WEBSTER'S I NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 613 (1984) (emphasis added).
95. Supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 324 n.13 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562, (1974)).
98. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 323 n.1 1 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
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Cognizant of Congress's overall desire to reduce frivolous prisoner
litigation, and aware that most prisoners file complaints IFP, the Third, Fifth,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals set forth a rigid and unforgiv-
ing construction of § 1915(g)'s "imminent danger of serious physical injury"
exception. This construction holds that a prisoner may invoke the "imminent
danger" exception only to seek relief from a danger which is "imminent" at
the time the complaint is filed. While such an interpretation does reduce
frivolous litigation, it ignores the following predicament: prisoners with
three strikes seeking IFP status are faced with the insurmountable obstacle of
showing that a serious physical injury is about to befall them at any moment,
and they may not predicate their showing on an ongoing risk based on past
events.
It is a non sequitur to argue in matters of court procedure or civil in-
junctions that imminent danger means "ongoing" or "likely to occur," while
a less realistic, time-sensitive, and practical definition of the term is prof-
fered in the circumstance of life-threatening prison violence. In fact, any
scenario in which life is at risk certainly demands at least as encompassing a
definition of "imminent danger" as, say an environmental injunction case.
Indeed, the politics of being "tough on crime" and the desire to reduce trivial
litigation should not result in placing prisoners in "imminent danger of seri-
ous physical injury" with no true recourse.
Congress should amend § 1915(g) to provide meaningful and clear
guidance for what the term "imminent danger" means. This will allow
courts to interpret the statute with confidence and accuracy so that they may
handle the large number of prisoner lawsuits without overlooking the very
real danger that some inmates face on a daily basis while in prison.
And in the interim, courts should reconsider their strict and unforgiv-
ing approach toward interpreting what Congress failed to elucidate. Indeed,
persistent, ongoing imminent danger is a condition all too often encountered
in our nation's prisons. The methodology adopted by the Abdul-Akbar dis-
senters adequately serves to reduce much of the frivolous litigation, while
not abandoning the rights of prisoners to have their physical well-being safe-
guarded. Otherwise, we must ask ourselves the following: "What, then, will
suffice? Must a prisoner be running from his attackers as he files?"99 By
limiting the imminent danger exception to the "sword of Damocles" situa-
tion, it is unmistakable that the current, narrow interpretation of "imminent
danger" all but writes the exception out of the statute.'00 Until clearly in-
structed by Congress to interpret the statute in this harsh and rigorous man-
99. Id. at 324 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
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ner, courts should err on the side of protecting the physical safety of inmates
who are unable to legally do so themselves. Justice and fairness demand
nothing less.

